State of Utah v. Austin Whitely : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
State of Utah v. Austin Whitely : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Chez, Zelph S. Calder; attorneys for plaintiff and respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State of Utah v. Whitely, No. 6191 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/532
ln t4t &uprtmt atnurt 
nft4r 
&tate nf l!ltalJ 
STATE OF UT~\H, 
Plainti.ff and Respondent, 
\S . No. 6191 
. AUSTIN WHITELY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAI~TIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEliENT OF FACTS 
The appellant in the trial court announced through 
his counsel that he desired to waive a jury and try the 
cause before the court. The trial court, with the approval 
of the District Attorney, consneted to appellant's request 
and dismissed the jury. 
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To the trial court's conviction of burglary, appel-
lant claims error to this court for the following reasons: 
(1) There was insufficient evidence to warrant a con-
viction. ( 2) The corpus delecti was not established; and 
(3) The trial court erred in holding that the burden of 
proof shifted to the defendant when he presented his 
alibi. 
The first two points are similar, hence will be treated 
together. 
Appellant's recitation of the facts, and the tran-
script of the testimony form ample argument and au-
thority to support and uphold the trial court's judgment-
A few observations will, we believe, conclusively rest 
the judgment of this court with that of the trial court. 
A crime of burglary in the second degree was com-
mitted in the home of Arthur D. Miller, Farmington, 
Utah, about eight o'clock November 31, 1938. This was 
admitted by the appellant. (Tr. p. 40). It was also 
admitted by him that the person who confronted Deputy 
Sheriff Oviatt with a gun about eight p. m. November 
20, just north of the intersection of Lagoon Lane and 
the old State Highway was the guilty person. ( Tr. p. 6;)). 
Hence, all that \vas left for the state to do was to estab-
lish the evidence of identity of the person who confront-
ed the sheriff (above mentioned) with that of the apel-
lant. 
Reed Oviatt, a Deputy Sheriff, testified that he and 
his wife left their home east on Lagoon Lane jw;;t be-
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fore eight p. m. N oYemlwr :10. 1n:~s; that on npproneh-
ino- the interseetion of the hig·hwaY and Lagoon LanP, 0 '-- • 
about three bloeks north of Farmington, Utnh, he no-
ticed the tread marks of the tires of a parked automobile 
as being "the kind of tread marks we were looking for." 
(Tr. p. 53); that he further exmned the tires and auto-
mobile "ith his flash light; that it was a dark blue 1~1:~2 
ChevTolet coaeh 1'ith red wire wheels, a fish-pole antenae 
on the left side and had screw type general tires; that 
he sent his "ife to phone Deputy Sheriff Roberts and 
waited in a fruit stand about 19 feet south of said inter-
section on the southwest corner: that said car was near 
the fruit stand: that ~\rthur ~filler's home, where the 
burglary was committed, was west from said intersec-
tion about 150 yards. ( Tr. p. -!5). The pertinent testimony 
of Deputy Sheriff Reed Oviatt reads as follows: (Tr. 
p. 58) 
"I stepped hack in the fruit stand to watch 
for the burglar, (Tr. p. 58) and ~Ir. Roberts all(} 
I had been back there a minute or two and I saw 
a fellow come up the sidewalk, up Lagoon Lane 
u"'**on the opposite side of the lane from me 
*****in a northeasterly direction * * * he was 
coming up the lane. He had his arms full of 
things*****. Instead of coming over to the car, 
he walked right to the corner and then turnefl 
north. *****I proceeded to overtake him. I caught 
up with him there, right in front of E~mma l\Iil-
ler*****225 feet north from the fruit stand 
*****.He dropped some things he had in his arms 
and instantaneously turned arouncl.*****He told 
me he had a shot gun and ordered me to stop, 
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and not move. Then he hacked around me; and I 
had my flashlight in my hand. He asked what I 
had and I told him. He said, 'Drop it,' and I 
dropped that. He backed around me. Backed to-
ward the sidewalk and started hack down the 
sidewalk.'' ( Tr. p. 60) 
Said Reed Oviatt further testified that there was a 
light on both corners; that he could see his facial fea-
tures but could not tell the color of his eyes. (Tr. p. 61). 
That when he reached a point about 90 feet south on the 
sidewalk he shot at him and that he ran and got into the 
mentioned parked ear and drove away. 
:Mr. Oviatt identified the defendant In the court-
room as the person he saw on the above mentioned oc-
casion. (Tr. p. 61). 
The above mentioned scene, on cross examination 
of 1Ir. Oviatt, was acted in the court room; defense coun-
sel :Mr. 1fcCarty taking the part of the Deputy Sheriff, 
and 1fr. Oviatt taking the part of the criminal. (Tr. p. 
77). 
On re-direct examination 1Ir. Oviatt identified the 
car which appelant drove to the court room as the same 
car he examined on the night of November 30th, and the 
same car that appellant got into when fleeing from the 
scene of the "stick-up". 
Appellant's counsel in his brief advances consider-
able persuasion to the effect that appellant is not the 
guilty person; that his identity could not he certain under 
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the circumstances. His argument treats wholly ot' the 
weight of the evidence. It is a good jury argument; but 
for this court which is concerned only with the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence, his argument we be-
lie\e partakes of little force against the overwhelming 
endence above related. 
""..,.. e believe the evidence so conclusively passes the 
tf'st of sufficient evidence that it is unnecessary to cite 
authority in support of our contention. 
III. 
Appellant next claims "That the Trial Court erred 
in holding that the burden of proof shifted to the de-
fendant when he presented his alibi.'' 
First, we have endeavored to find where such a 
claim, if it represents the trial court's position, goes to 
prejudice the substantial rights of the appellant; and 
second we fail to find in the court's comments on alibi, 
where it found erroneously. 
The trial court in its "memorandum decision" with 
respect to alibi states as follows: (Tr. p. 17) 
"The court can not say that the defendant 
has by that alibi offered sufficient proof to es-
tablish a reasonable doubt that he was not at 
Farmington at the time of the burglary, as 
against the other testimony in the case, estab-
lished hy direct and circumstantial evidence in 
the case. 
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"In the case of State v. Vanek, 84 Pac. (2nd) 567, 
the Idaho Supre1ne Court held: 
(6, 7) "Where a defendant relies upon the de-
fense of alibi, the burden of et:ltablishing such de-
fense is upon him, and if he succeeds, by compe-
tent evidence, in establishing a reat:l<mahle doubt 
in the minds of the jury, as to his presence at the 
time and place when and where the offense wm; 
committed, when the committing of the offen~e 
by him made his presence imperative, he is en-
titled to an acquittal, but the character and ex-
tent of the evidence requisite to create such doubt 
is a matter for the jury.'' 
''In reaching the decision the Court holds the 
defendant, under the case recited above, failed to 
prove hit5 alibi by competent evidence, sufficient 
to create doubt in the mind of the Court. 
''The court is, therefore, of the opinion that 
the motion for a new trial should be denied, aiHl 
such is the Order of the Court.'' 
The law in Utah, prior to the adoption of the new 
code of criminal procedure in 1935, allowed the defend-
ant to raise a defense of alibi at any time without notire 
to the State. The State would in many cases be taken by 
surprise and not have an opportunity to properly meet 
said defense. rrhe result was in many cases just prose-
cution circumvented. 
Judicial decisions recognize this for Common-
wealth v. Stine, 158 Atl. 602 (Penn.) at page 602 says: 
''But in every case where the defense of ali hi 
is made it should be very closely scrutinized for 
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the reason so forcibly expressed by an emint>nt 
judge. It is a defense often attempted by eon-
trivance, subordination, or perjury, nnd the proof 
therefore offered to sustain it is to be subjeeh~d 
to a ri(l"id scrutinY. because, without attemptin~ 0 • , 
to contest or rebut the evidence of facts sustain-
ing the charge, it attempts to prove affirmatively 
another fact whollY inconsistent with it, and this 
defense is equally. available if satisfaetorily es-
tablished to avoid the force of positive as of cir-
cumstantial evidence.'' 
The Laws of Utah, 1935, Chapter 120, Section 1, on 
page 231, reads as follows: 
'' "nenever a defendant shall propose to of-
fer in his defense evidence to establish an alibi on 
behalf of the defendant, such defendant shall at 
the time of the arraignment or within ten days 
thereafter, but not less than four days before the 
trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prose-
cuting attorney in such cause, notice in writing of 
his intention to claim such defense, and in case of 
a claimed alibi, such notice shall include specific 
information as to the place at which the accused 
claims to have been at the time of the alleged 
offense. 
''If the Defendant fails to file such notice he 
shall not be entitled to introduce evidence tend-
ing to establish an alibi. The court may, however, 
permit such evidence to be introduced where good 
cause for the failure to file the notice has been 
made to appear.'' 
It is apparent that the 1935 Legislature, through the 
last quoted section, recognized the principle announced 
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in the Stine case which sought to prevent escape of jus-
tice through the defense of alibi. It appears that the Leg-
islature intended the defense of alibi to be raised as an 
affirmative defense, and to require the defendant to go 
further and appraise the state in advance where he 
claims he was at the time of the commission of the al-
leged crime. Under such a legislative provision, it surely 
could not fall on the State the responsibility to prove de-
fendant was not at said certain place before he estab-
lished proof that he was at said place. It seems very plain 
that it is the duty of the defense to go forward and es-
tablish his affirmative defense of alibi. 
The Trial Court's holding strikes at the question of 
guilt or innocence. It does not mean that the defendant, 
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, has to establish 
his innocence. It simply means that if he can succeed 
through his defense of alibi in establishing a doubt of his 
guilt in the minds of the jury then he deserves an ac-
quittal. 
In other words, assume the minds of the jury reflect 
the guilt of the defendant before he raises his defense of 
alibi. He is clothed with an additional protection of alihi 
to effect a change in the minds of the jury from that of 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of that of questionable 
doubt which effects a result of innocent. 
There are many jurisdictions that hold the hurden 
of proving an alibi rests with the accm;;ed, ( 16 C .• J. 5:1:1) 
including Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, and Iowa. 
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Even if the Trial Court was in error on tlw qm~stion 
of alibi, the error does not rPnch into prPjmlit•in~ t lw 
substantial rights of this appt:>lant bPenuse tlw t•onrt n~ 
a finder of the facts found him guilty. 
We submit that the Trial Court <>ommitted no error 
prejudicing the substantial rights of this appellant aml 
that he was also given a fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General. 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
Asst. Attorney General. 
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